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Abstract
Using the unique combined dataset of three previous surveys, this paper examines the 
effects of corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam. 
Five measures of corporate governance and three variable proxies for performance are 
employed to investigate effects of corporate governance on performance. Estimated results 
show that Chair-CEO duality positively correlates with better performance, and increasing the 
size of the board of directors is negatively associated with worse performance regardless of 
performance measures. These empirical effects are the same across sectors, export and import
–related enterprises, and between female and male CEO enterprises. Independence of the 
board has no link to performance of enterprises. Such results contribute to the extant 
literature by providing empirical evidence and shedding light on understanding the effects of 
corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Research on corporate governance 
has been well documented in the 
literature, especially since the collapse 
of many large corporations such as 
Enron, Xerox, Tyco, and WorldCom in 
the early 2000s. Accounting scandals 
implicitly took place inside those 
corporations due to lack of efficient 
mechanisms on corporate governance. 
As a result, there was a wave of 
regulations on corporate governance 
to aid in preventing similar problems 
occurring in the future. Those 
regulations focused on improving the 
corporate governance environment, 
calling for strict application of 
principles of corporate governance, 
implementing guidelines on the 
independence of the board of 
directors and audit committees of 
firms. Sound corporate governance is 
so important that both the NASDAQ 
stock market and New York Stock 
Exchange require listed companies to 
have a majority of independent 
directors. Regulations on corporate 
governance were enacted in those 
listed firms to enhance their corporate 
government mechanism as the priority 
of financial revolution, increase of 
public confidence, enhancement of 
corporate governance, and assurance 
of firm development.
The private sector is the most 
dynamic and economically efficient 
sector in the Vietnamese economy. It 
plays a significant role, generating 
49.4 percent of total GDP and 
employing 86.3 percent of the total 
labor force (GSO, 2013). While state 
owned enterprises show their 
inefficiency, private counterparts have 
been significantly developing, particularly 
after the introduction of the Law on 
Enterprise 2005. Many private enterprises 
have developed and become large 
companies that follow models of 
economic groups. In practice, 
however, private economic groups (or 
large private enterprises, hereafter 
used interchangeably) are facing many 
issues, which originate from week 
corporate governance. Main owners of 
large private enterprises commonly 
have cross-ownership in many other 
companies and financial institutions, 
and decision making of those 
enterprises is mostly made by those 
cross-ownership shareholders. It is 
“bad” corporate governance that can 
cause serious consequences such as 
erosion of competitiveness, undermining 
innovation, and eliminating transparency, 
accountability, and economic efficiency. 
In the context of Vietnam, hidden 
agreements, cross-ownership, and lack 
of transparency and accountability in 
large private enterprises likely lead to 
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an unfair business environments, 
conflicting interest groups, corruption, 
and ultimately instability of the 
macroeconomic structure(Le, 2013).
Studies on the impacts of corporate 
governance on performance of the 
firms are intensively documented in 
the literature, and empirical results are 
largely differentiated because of the 
wide range of measurements for 
corporate governance. By using the 
different proxies for corporate 
governance and different datasets, the 
empirical results are also diversified. 
For example, studies that used the 
independence of the board of 
directors as a measure of corporate 
governance found that increasing 
independence of the board of 
directors is strongly associated with 
better firm performance(Bhagat & 
Black, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1998, 2003), but recently Bhagat and 
Bolton,(2008) found a negative 
relationship between board independence 
and operating performance.; Bhagat, 
Carey, and Elson(1999) found that the 
size of the board is negatively linked 
to the performance of firms while CEO 
duality concluded ambiguous empirical 
results (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 
1997). This research topic, however, 
has not been intensively studied in 
Vietnam yet because of a limited 
dataset to support this kind of 
research. To our knowledge, Vo and 
Phan(2013) is among one of the first 
papers that examined the effects of 
corporate governance on firm 
performance in Vietnam. By applying 
FGLS estimation methods for 77 listed 
firms on the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange and which were continuously 
active during the period from 
2006-2011, this paper found that 
duality is associated with better 
performance, the size of the board of 
directors is negatively linked to firm 
performance, and the structure of 
ownership has no linear relationship 
with the performance of surveyed 
firms. Along with Vo and Phan (2013), 
this paper is among the pioneering 
papers on investigating the impacts of 
corporate governance on the performance 
of large private enterprises in Vietnam.
The primary objective of this paper 
is twofold: to develop a dataset 
describing governance and performance 
of large private enterprises and to 
investigate the impacts of corporate 
governance on the performance of 
large private enterprises (or private 
economic groups) in Vietnam. This 
paper used a unique dataset of the 
combined enterprise surveys conducted 
by GSO, by VNR’s 500 private 
enterprises completed by VNR Vietnam 
Report and Vietnamnet, and by the 
Research Project Code II.5.2-2012.3, 
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this paper found that different 
measures of corporate governance 
have different effects on firm 
performance, which is proxied by 
return on assets (ROA), before-tax 
profits, and state budget contribution. 
For the surveyed sample, duality is 
positively associated with better 
performance regardless of its 
measures, while the size of the board 
negatively affects performance of large 
private enterprises. Those results do 
not differ across sectors. The empirical 
results also support projections of 
managerial theory, stewardship theory 
on the importance of Chair-CEO 
duality and the size of the board.
The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the relevant literature and 
motivates our key hypotheses. Section 
3 introduces the development of our 
dataset and model specifications. 
Section 4 presents the results on the 
relationship between corporate governance 
and performance of large private 
enterprises in Vietnam. Section 5 
summarizes our key findings and 
concludes the paper.
Ⅱ. Literature Review
Studies on corporate governance 
and its effects on firm performance are 
quite well documented in the 
literature. This section briefly provides 
measurements of corporate governance 
and firm performance, and it also 
reviews the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance 
commonly found in the literature. This 
review aids in understanding and 
applying measurements of corporate 
governance and firm performance in 
the Vietnamese context in this paper.
1. Measure of Corporate
Governance
The term “corporate governance” is 
initially associated with the “principal- 
agent” problem. At the firm level, a 
“principal-agent” means a person who 
owns a firm but is not the same 
person who controls it. In this sense, 
corporate governance is initiates from 
private sector and its conception 
traditionally focuses on the corporation- 
shareholder relationship. OECD(2004) 
provides a broader definition of 
corporate governance as “the full set 
of relationships among a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. It provides the 
structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance determined.” 
Another definition of corporate 
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governance is provided by Barrett 
(2002) who said that this pertained to 
the ways an organization deals with its 
various stakeholders. According to the 
World Bank(1999), corporate governance 
can be seen from two perspectives: 
external and internal corporate 
governance. External corporate governance 
deals with external stakeholders such 
as creditors, suppliers, and many 
others outside the organization, while 
internal corporate governance focuses 
on the board of director and the 
interests of shareholders. 
Corporate governance has been 
proxied using different ways and 
variables. Most studies on this issue 
use measurements that directly relate 
to the internal perspective of corporate 
governance. For example, Edward and 
Clough (2005) conduct a survey on 
measurements of corporate governance 
and find that the most common 
proxies used in the literature and in 
the corporate governance codes are as 
follows: (i) The size of the board of 
directors; (ii) Separation of Chairman 
and CEO (duality); (iii) Majority of the 
board being comprised of non- 
executives or board dominance of 
independent directors; (iv) Balance of 
directors' skills and competencies; and 
(v) Audit and other board committees. 
Edward and Clough(2005) also reviewed 
measurements for the external 
perspective of corporate governance 
such as effective board performance 
evaluations, transparent appointment 
processes, and adequate communication 
with investors. Some studies (Vo & 
Phan, 2013) used the presence of 
female board members and educational 
attainment level of board members as 
variables for corporate governance; 
while still others (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008) focused on median director- 
dollar value ownership and median 
director-percent value ownership as 
proxies for corporate governance.
Corporate governance is also measured 
by using comprehensive indexes. For 
example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) constructed the so-called G- 
index, consolidated from 24 variables, 
in which a higher G-index indicates 
more restrictions on shareholder rights 
or a greater number of anti-takeover 
measures. Another complicated measure 
of corporate governance which is 
based on six of the twenty-four 
G-Index provision is the E-index, 
developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell(2009). A high E-index is 
associated with weak shareholder 
rights. These indexes are considered 
as indicators of external corporate 
governance and commonly used to 
investigate the effects of interaction 
between several governance measures 
on firm performance. However, the 
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use of these indexes is limited since it 
is difficult for researchers to obtain 
data for calculating them (Cremers & 
Nair, 2005). For this reason, separate 
metrics of corporate governance are 
preferred in the empirical analyses of 
corporate governance and firm 
performance.
2. Performance of the
Enterprises
Many studies have developed 
indicators which are used to measure 
the performance of firms from 
different perspectives for a wide range 
of purposes. Richard et al.(2009) 
conducted a review of measurements 
of performance in related papers 
published in the top five management 
journals during 2002 and 2007, and 
they found little scientific debate on 
which measures are appropriate and 
how to combine measures in order to 
compare business performance. To 
investigate the relationship between 
corporate performance and performance 
of firms, several measurements of firm 
performance have been used. According 
to Bhagat and Bolton(2008) the most 
common proxies for firm performance 
can be summarized as;
- Return on Assets. -It is measured as 
operating income (in general, operating 
income before depreciation) divided 
by end of year total assets;
- Tobin's Q. -This indicator is calculated 
based on the procedure provided by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick(2003) and 
Tobin and Brainard(1968);
- Stock Retur. -It calculates one-year 
compounded returns, including dividends;
- Leverage. -It is measured as the sum 
of long term debt and the current 
portion of long term debt divided by 
total assets;
- Last 2 Years Performance. -The change 
in performance is computed, such as 
the growth rate of firm performance 
based on the past two years' 
performance;
- Industry Performance. -This measure is 
calculated using the mean performance 
for each SIC four-digit classification.
Because of data collection issues, 
many studies on this topic use only a 
single indicator of corporate performance. 
Return on assets, before-tax profits 
and payment to state budget are the 
three most often used performance 
measures.
3. Corporate Governance and
Enterprise Performance
Empirical results on the effects of 
corporate governance on firm 
performance widely vary across 
proxies of corporate governance and 
firm performance variables. To review, 
variables of corporate governance 
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commonly used are board size, 
independence of board of directors, 
Chair-CEO duality, G-index, and 
E-index; while corporate performance 
variables mostly include returns on 
assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.
The size of the board of directors 
has an ambiguous effect on ROA. For 
example, Lipton and Lorsch(1992), 
Jensen(1993), Yermack(1996), and Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen(2008) argue and 
empirically find that smaller board size 
is associated with more success of the 
firms; while many other studies find 
opposite empirical results(Klein, 1998; 
Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et al., 2008). 
Similarly, the effects of independence 
of the board of directors on firm 
performance are also mixed. Using 
different performance measures, Bhagat 
and Black(2002) find that firms with 
more independent boards do not 
perform better, and they also conclude 
that poorly performing firms are more 
likely to have more independent 
directors. Bhagat and Bolton(2008) 
find a negative relationship between 
board independence and firm 
performance. Bhagat and Bolton(2009) 
document that having a more 
independent board of directors does 
not lead to better performance and 
may actually lead to worse performance. 
Edward and Clough(2005) provide 
further review on this issue.
Using the G-index as a proxy for 
corporate governance, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008, 2009) find that stronger 
corporate governance strongly associates 
with higher operating performance 
with a variety of performance 
measures, including ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. This empirical result is also true for 
the E-index. For example, a firm with 
a higher E-index has lower firm 
valuation (Core, Guay & Rusticus, 
2007; Cremers & Nair, 2005). These 
mixed empirical results are also found 
in a review of Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008, 2009) and Edward and Clough 
(2005).
Other measures of corporate 
governance such as duality (separation 
of chairman and CEO) also have a 
mixed effect on firm performance. For 
example, Donaldson and David(1991) 
argue that an independent chair will 
enhance the board’s capacity to 
achieve business goals because the 
board provides a mechanism for 
keeping managerial actions in-check. 
Kocourek et al.(2003) add that there is 
no one to talk openly and in depth to 
about the difficulties faced by 
organizations, and the chair can play 
this supportive role in this case. 
Heracleous(2001) provides empirical 
evidence that whether the chair and 
CEO are separate or the same person 
does not appear to make much 
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difference on the performance of 
firms.
It is obvious from the literature that 
the impacts of corporate governance 
on the performance of firms are 
ambiguous or mixed. The empirical 
results of those various studies are 
different due to differences in 
measures of corporate governance and 
a variety of performance measurements. 
Using the unique combination of 
available dataset and survey on 
large-scale private enterprises, this 
paper tries to further empirically 
investigate this relationship in the 
context of Vietnam. Particularly, this 
paper will examine the effects of 
corporate governance measured by 
duality, size of board, independence 
of board, and presence of female 
board members on the performance of 
large private enterprises as measured 
by ROA, before-tax profits, and their 
annual budget contribution.
Ⅲ. Methodology
Framework
1. Data and Variables
Data used in this paper was 
collected from a combination of three 
sources. The first data set is the 
Enterprise Survey, which was conducted 
by the General Statistical Office of 
Vietnam. This is an annual survey and 
the sample size is very large, like a 
census. For example, there were 
358,557 enterprises in all sectors 
surveyed in 2012. This data source 
provides all the information needed 
including firm characteristics, financial 
results, among others and covers two 
years; 2011 and 2012. The second 
data set is from the survey conducted 
by VNR Vietnam Report and 
Vietnamnet. This survey consists of 
500 of the largest private enterprises 
currently operating in Vietnam. In this 
paper, those enterprises are considered 
as private economic groups. This data 
set includes information such as the 
name, CEO, and business registration 
of these enterpriese. The third data set 
is the survey conducted by the group 
which worked on Research Project 
Code II.5.2-2012.3. Based on the 
surveyed enterprises in the VNR 
Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet data 
set, we asked questions on corporate 
governance issues. Because each 
enterprise has a unique taxation code 
and those codes are available in all 
surveys, the taxation codes become 
the key for combining the three data 
sets from the three surveys. 
Variables are purposely divided into 
three groups: (i) variables measuring 
firm performance, (ii) variables measuring 
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<Table 1> Definitions of Variables
Acronym Variable Definition
Firm performance variables
ROA Return on assets It equals before-tax income divided by total assets 
BTP Before-tax profit Total before-tax profit of surveyed large private enterprises
SBC State budget contribution Total amount paid to state budget in 2012
Corporate governance variables
Dual Chair-CEO duality It equals 1 if the chair is also the CEO  of the firm, and 0 otherwise 
SDB Size of director board Numbers of board of director members
GENC Gender of CEO It equals 1 if CEO is male, 0 if otherwise.
IBM Independent board members Numbers of independent board members
SEB Size of executive board Numbers of people in the executive board
Others firm variables
SOF Firm size It is measured by book value of log of total assets.
AOF Firm age Years of operation
LEV Leverage Long term debt divided by total assets
GCEO Gender of CEO It equals 1 if male CEO and 0 if otherwise.
EMP Export-import It equals 1 if a firm has exports or imports, 0 if otherwise.
INZ In industrial zone It equals 1 if a firm is in industrial zones, 0 if otherwise.
AGR Enterprises in agricultural sector It equals 1 if a firm is in agricultural sectors, 0 if otherwise.
IND Enterprises in industrial sector It equals 1 if a firm is in industrial sectors, 0 if otherwise.
corporate governance, and (iii) other 
variables of firms. Definitions and 
measurements of all variables used in 
the paper are provided in Table 1.
The questionnaires were sent to 500 
of the largest private enterprises 
(according to the ranking of 
VNR500-2013) and the survey was 
conducted either through face-to-face 
or telephone interviews or through 
email. Secondary data were obtained 
and consolidation from the enterprises’ 
annual financial reports was done. 
Approximately 277 enterprises responded 
to the survey, but only data from 254 
enterprises were used for this analysis 
due to missing key indicator data 
necessary for analysis. Those private 
economic groups under study were 
gathered from the survey of the NVR 
Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet. 
Out of 254 private corporations that 
fully responded to the survey, about 
36 percent of the corporations have 
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duality of Chair and CEO; the average 
size of the board of 5.7, while the 
average size of the executive board is 
4.5 members. Most of the surveyed 
enterprises have a long history of 
operation, and average operating 
duration is 33.5 years. Large private 
enterprises in Vietnam are mostly in 
manufacturing (62.8 percent) and the 
service sector (35.7 percent) with 
about half of them directly involved in 
import and export activities. 
Descriptive statistics of the above 
variables are presented in Annex 1.
The results of our descriptive 
analysis, presented in Annex 2, show 
that Chair-CEO duality lowers the 
firm’s performance in terms of all 
three firm performance measures. 
Female-CEO enterprises display worse 
performance than male-CEO counterparts. 
A similar result can be observed across 
sectors, especially in the industry and 
service sectors. These results will be 
thoroughly tested later.
2. Estimated Models
In investigating the impacts of 
corporate governance on the performance 
of large private enterprises in Vietnam. 
Two different performance measures 
were used in association with corporate 
governance variables and variables of 
firm characteristics. Multivariate regression 
models were estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares method. The 
general estimated model is specified as 
follows:
Y = f(X, Z, u),
where Y represents the dependent 
variables, including return on assets 
(ROA), Before-tax profit (BTP) and 
State budget contribution (SBC) of the 
large private enterprises.
- X includes variables measuring 
corporate governance such as size of 
the board, independent board 
members, Chair-CEO duality, and the 
number of female board members. 
Each regression model uses only one 
corporate governance measure.
- Z includes other control variables 
of the surveyed enterprises.
- U refer to the error terms.
Since multivariate regression is used 
to estimate the effects of corporate 
governance on performance, assumptions 
of multicollinearity, homoscedasticity 
and linearity are also tested. The 
Pearson correlation matrix and variance 
inflation factor (VIF) computation are 
used to test the multicollinearity 
assumption, while the white tests are 
conducted to test for homoscedasticity 
assumptions.
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<Table 2> Tests for Heteroskedasticity: The White Test
White test statistics Chi-Square P-value Observations
Return on assets 2.39 0.3102 253
Before-tax profit 1.74 0.4187 236
State budget contribution 2.40 0.3007 254
Source: Computed from the surveyed data
Ⅳ. Results and
Discussion
Before examining the effects of 
corporate governance on large private 
enterprises in Vietnam, we conducted 
tests for multicollinearity and 
homoscedasticity. The results of the 
Pearson correlation matrix are presented 
in Annex 2. Small coefficients of the 
Pearson correlation matrix along with 
variables and low variance inflation 
factors imply that there is no 
significantly high correlation among 
the independent variables. Those test 
results suggest that there is no 
significant multicollinearity in the data. 
To test for heteroscedasticity, the 
White test was used in which the null 
hypothesis proves the presence of 
homoscedasticity. Empirical results of 
the White test presented in Table 2 
give no evidence of heteroscedasticity 
in the regression models.
In order to estimate the effects of 
governance on firm performance, this 
paper employs three measures for firm 
performance and five measures for 
corporate governance. The estimated 
effects of corporate governance on 
three aspects of firm performance are 
presented in Table 3.
Chair-CEO duality has a positive and 
significant effect on firm performance. 
With three proxies of firm performance, 
estimated results consistently and 
statistically significantly imply that 
Chair-CEO duality  increases firm 
performance. This empirical result 
supports the managerial theory and 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman 
& Donaldson, 1997) and previous 
empirical results of Daily and 
Dalton(1997) and Rechner and Dalton 
(1991). Chair-CEO duality is considered 
to foster and unify leadership rather 
than weaken the independence of the 
board from management and 
monitoring roles. Thus, it does not 
reduce the supervision of the board 
over firm activities and performance, 
and helps increase the efficiency of 
the firm. In the context of Vietnam, 
Chair-CEO duality increases the power 
of the CEO, enabling him or her to 
appropriately respond to dynamic 
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<Table 3> Effects of corporate governance on large private enterprises in Vietnam
BTP(model 1) SBC(model 2) ROA(model 3)
Duality 0.546** 0.373* 0.048**
Size of board -0.020 0.031 -0.012*
Gender of CEO -0.055 0.541* -0.022
Executive board members 0.038** 0.028 0.009**
Independent board members 0.045 -0.052 0.009
Age of firms 0.010 0.003 0.001
Log of total assets 0.922*** 0.844*** 0.005
Leverage -0.916*** -0.516*** -0.136***
Export and import activities 0.370* 0.719*** 0.042*
In industrial zone 0.710*** 0.449* 0.036
Agriculture -2.277*** -1.746** -0.097
Industry -0.780*** -0.414** -0.030
Constant -8.940*** -8.634*** 0.158*
Observations 236 254 253
R-squared 0.5743 0.5974 0.2275
Significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are noted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
events amidst a more transparent 
Vietnamese economy. This result 
suggests that it is not necessary to 
separate the CEO and Chair in private 
enterprises in order to pursue and 
attain better performance within the 
enterprises.
When using size of the board as a 
measure of governance, estimated 
results shows a negative and 
statistically significant effect on firm 
performance. Holding other variables 
constant, an additional member in the 
board would decrease ROA of the firm 
by 1.2%, annually. This estimated 
result is corroborated by empirical 
findings in literature. A large board 
size enterprise often has diversity of 
opinions that take time to get these 
board members into consensus model 
and thus this can negatively impact on 
decision making relative strategic 
issues or business development directions. 
Another estimated result shows that a 
larger executive board is statistically 
and significantly associated with better 
performance of enterprises. This 
suggests that diversity of opinion on 
daily operating decisions would 
reduce the risks of business and 
eventually improve firm performance.
Other measures of corporate 
governance such as gender of CEO 
and independence of the board do not 
statistically or significantly affect the 
performance of the enterprises. A 
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possible reason for this result is that 
the number of female-CEO enterprises 
in the sample and the number of 
independent board members are so 
small that they do not make a 
significant contribution to corporate 
performance.
One notable estimated result here is 
that leverage has negatively and 
statistically significant effects on firm 
performance in all three measures. 
This implies that a firm having more 
long-term debts would be associated 
with worse performance because 
higher leverage means higher agency 
costs and diverging interests across 
managers, shareholders, and debtholders. 
Thus, it should be considered a moral 
hazard issue that causes leverage to 
negatively link to performance. This is 
very true in the Vietnamese context, 
particularly  in the current condition 
marked by economic difficulties. Over 
a long period or from October 2009 to 
June 2012, interest rates for bank 
loans were kept at a significantly high 
level, at almost 20% annually, and 
even more than 20% for some 
unofficial financial intermediaries. 
Debt financing and interest payment 
obligations put pressure on managers 
to perform in such a way to reduce 
“free cash-flow,” or else be under 
threat of bankruptcy if these 
obligations cannot be satisfied. 
The paper also estimated models 
that included interaction terms of 
Chair-CEO duality and the sector 
which the firm belonged to, in order 
to determine if Chair-CEO duality has 
different effects on the performance of 
firms in different sectors. Estimated 
results showed no difference in firm 
performance across sectors due to 
Chair-CEO duality or between female 
and male CEO enterprises. Similar 
empirical results were also found for 
interaction terms of Chair-CEO duality 
and export-import related enterprises.
Ⅴ. Conclusion and
Recommendations
This paper is one of the pioneer 
studies on the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance 
of firms in Vietnam. This research has 
provided new evidence on the 
relationship between corporate governance 
and performance of large private 
enterprises in Vietnam. We used the 
unique combined data set of three 
previous surveys: the enterprise survey 
in 2013, the survey of the 500 largest 
private enterprises in 2013, and the 
survey under the research project code 
Ⅱ.5.2-2012.3 for this assignment. 
Initially, tests for multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity of the data and 
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estimated models were conducted to 
make sure estimates were consistent. 
Next, the paper developed five 
measures of corporate governance 
(Chair-CEO duality, size of the board, 
gender of CEO, size of the executive 
board, and independence of the 
board) and three variables for 
performance (before-tax profits, contribution 
to state budget, and return on assets) 
to investigate the effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance. 
Estimated results show mixed effects 
of corporate governance on the 
performance of private enterprises. 
In the context of state-owned 
enterprises with low efficiency, 
development of the private enterprises 
should be a focus for economic 
growth and development of the 
country. Based on the empirical 
results, good corporate governance 
practice would strongly associate with 
better performance of private enterprises. 
This suggests that Chair-CEO duality is 
not necessarily “bad” for the firm’s 
performance since, Chair-CEO duality 
would unify the leadership to respond 
to dynamic changes and information 
asymmetries in the Vietnamese 
economy. The size of the board, 
however, has negative effects on 
performance. This empirical result 
implies that fewer board members 
would be associated with better 
performance, and it would be a good 
reference for applying Circular No. 
121/2012/TT-BTC(Ministry of Finance, 
2012) on regulations about corporate 
governance which is applied to public 
companies.
Based on this empirical analysis, 
some recommendations would be:
- It is not necessarily “bad” for 
private enterprises to have Chair-CEO 
duality. Chair-CEO duality is good for 
performance because unified leadership 
would help to promptly respond to 
dynamic changes and information 
asymmetries in the business environment 
in Vietnam.
- Private enterprises should keep the 
size of their board of directors at a 
minimum. Estimated results imply that 
smaller board size correlates with 
better performance of the enterprises. 
Although enterprises must follow 
regulations from the Vietnamese 
government under Circular No. 121/ 
2012/TT-BTC, they should keep the 
size of their board as small as they can. 
- Private enterprises should minimize 
their long–term debts in order to have 
better performance. Estimated results 
show a negative effect of leverage on 
performance regardless of the 
measurement of firm performance. It 
is not a good idea for enterprises to 
borrow excessively via long-term loans 
since this decreases the “free 
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cash-flow,” interest payment obligations, 
and there is the threat of bankruptcy 
to contend with if these obligations 
are not satisfied. These put strong 
pressure on executive managers and 
correspondingly affect the performance 
of enterprises.
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<Annex 1> Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gender of CEO 0.888 0.316 0 1
Size of board 5.747 1.703 1 11
Duality 0.360 0.481 0 1
Executive board 4.549 2.843 1 12
Female E.B. members 1.033 1.250 0 6
Members in both DB and ED 1.908 1.264 0 8
Independent board members 3.117 1.827 0 10
Return on assets 0.077 0.301 -4.00 1.06
Before-tax profit 311.4 -2501.1 1056.6 31654.0
State budget contribution 228.7 1336.7 0.001 19608.6
In industrial zone 0.165 0.372 0 1
Export and import activities 0.487 0.501 0 1
Age of firms 33.471 14.910 5 68
Total assets 3180.3 14751.3 0.01 148105.5
Total employees 1087.4 2217.8 300.5 29601.5
Agriculture 0.014 0.120 0 1
Industry 0.628 0.484 0 1
Service 0.357 0.480 0 1
Leverage 1.183 -0.522 0.04 2.54
Observations 254
Source: Calculated from surveyed sample 
<Annex 2> Enterprise Governance and Performance
Agriculture Industry Service Total
No Dual No Dual No Dual No Dual
ROA (%) 2.4 6.3 10.5 12.6 -1.6 8.4 6.3
BTP (bil. dong) 1.3 545.9 64.6 284.0 91.0 442.2 73.9
SBC (bil. dong) 11.1 274.5 226.9 236.7 110.5 255.3 185.3
Female
CEO
Male
CEO
Female
CEO
Male
CEO
Female
CEO
Male
CEO
Female
CEO
Male
CEO
ROA (%) 2.4 1.7 8.3 -5.8 11.2 -2.9 9.1
BTP (bil. dong) 1.3 5.2 399.9 397.2 171.8 245.4 319.8
SBC (bil. dong) 11.1 15.0 275.2 326.7 154.0 206.0 231.6
Source: Computed from the surveyed data
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